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The paper develops a political economy model to assess the interplay between party
formation and an environmental policy dimension viewed as secondary to the redis-
tributive dimension. We de￿ne being a secondary issue in terms of the intensity of
preferences over this issue rather than in terms of the proportion of voters who care
for the environment. Equilibrium policies are the outcome of an electoral competi-
tion game between endogenous parties.
We obtain the following results: i) The Pigouvian tax never emerges in an
equilibrium; ii) The equilibrium environmental tax is larger when there is a minority
of green voters; iii) Stable green parties exist only if there is a minority of green voters
and income polarization is large enough relative to the saliency of the environmental
issue. We also study the redistributive policies advocated by green parties.
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The objective of this paper is to study electoral competition when the policy space
is composed of a ￿frontline issue￿ , redistribution, and of a ￿secondary issue￿ , envir-
onmental policy. Frontline issues are those that are considered important enough
that they drive the vote of a large fraction of the electorate. Prominent examples are
the aggregate level of government spending or the degree of income redistribution.
By opposition, secondary issues are not the main focus of a large fraction of the
electorate. Such secondary issues include gun control, trade policy, foreign aid or
environmental policy. Many authors then take the view that secondary issues are
better studied in the context of special interest politics, and especially of lobbies.
A recent paper by List and Sturm (2006) argues to the contrary that electoral in-
centives constitute an important determinant of policy choices for secondary issues
as well. While List and Sturm (2006) focus on political accountability (how incent-
ives for being reelected a⁄ect the incumbent￿ s choices in both issues), our focus is
on political compromise: how incentives for winning elections a⁄ect all politicians￿
willingness to compromise on both issues.
We choose environmental policy as the secondary dimension because we are espe-
cially interested in understanding the role that the formation of political parties plays
on that policy domain. Our main motivation is the emergence in the last decades
of ￿green parties￿which are mainly focused on the environment. We wish to better
understand how these parties survive in a political system where environmental is-
sues are not frontline for a majority of voters, and what type of redistributive policy
green parties advocate at equilibrium. More precisely, we wish to shed light on the
following questions. Under which circumstances (if any) is the equilibrium envir-
onmental policy e¢ cient? How is this policy a⁄ected by the proportion of voters
who care about pollution? What are the necessary conditions to be satis￿ed for a
green party to form at equilibrium? Can we have more than one green party at
equilibrium? Who forms the constituency of a green party? Why is it that green
parties are overwhelmingly associated with strong redistributive concerns?1
To the best of our knowledge, the political economy literature has not developed
electoral competition models where the environment is secondary to another dimen-
sion. A large fraction of this literature assumes that the environmental policy is
shaped by the action of lobbies and adopts mainly the menu auction approach ￿rst
introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and popularized by Grossman and
Helpman (2002). In this approach, elections are typically not explicitly modelled.2
1 See Neumayer (2004) and the many references there in for empirical evidence.
2With the exception of Wilson and Damania (2005) who combine common agency and Downsian
1Recent surveys of this literature include Heyes and Dijkstra (2001) and Oates and
Portney (2003).
A second branch of the political economy literature, beginning with Congleton
(1992) and sometimes referred to as ￿majority voting models￿ , applies variants and
extensions of the median voter model to diverse economic settings. For instance,
Mc Ausland (2003) uses a majority voting model to analyze how inequality and
openness to trade interact to determine voters￿demand for environmental policy,
and Jones and Manuelli (2001) and Kempf and Rossignol (2007) study voting over
environmental policy in growth models. A small number of papers introduce however
both the redistributive and the environmental dimensions, and use di⁄erent political
equilibrium concepts (sequential voting for Cremer et al. (2004), Party Unanimity
Nash Equilibrium (PUNE) for Cremer et al. (2008)) but they do not model the
environment as secondary.3 As for List and Sturm (2006), we di⁄er from them on
two main accounts. First, they develop a political agency model with an incumbent,
while we focus on electoral competition between parties. Second, they introduce
term limits in order to generate - and test - empirical predictions, while our paper
is exclusively theoretical.
We develop a two-dimensional model with endogenous parties based on Levy
(2004). There is a continuum of voters who di⁄er according to two traits: their
income and their concern for the environment. Each trait can take two values,
so that there are four groups of people. There are two goods in the economy, the
numeraire and a polluting good. Public policy consists of two linear tax rates, one on
income and one on the consumption of the polluting good. Tax proceeds are rebated
lump sum to all citizens. Public policy is the result of electoral competition between
political parties. This can be viewed as a two-stage process. In the ￿rst stage,
representatives of the di⁄erent groups form political parties. In the second stage,
these parties simultaneously propose political platforms, composed of an income tax
rate and an environmental tax rate, in order to win the elections. The party that
gets a plurality of the votes wins the election and implements its proposed policy.
The crucial assumption is that the set of policies that a party can commit to is
endogenous. If a party is made of a single type of citizens, the only proposal it can
commit to is their most-preferred policy. On the other hand, if a party is made of
citizens of di⁄erent types, the party can commit to any policy that belongs to the
Pareto set of its founders. An equilibrium political state is a partition of citizens into
parties and a vector of electoral platforms such that (i) no citizen has an incentive
to split up the party he belongs to, or to merge it with another party and (ii) no
party can make its members better-o⁄ by choosing another electoral platform.
politics.
3Also related are the papers by Brett and Keen (2000) and Anesi (2006a), who study the
earmarking of environmental taxes in di⁄erent electoral competition models with two policy in-
struments.
2We obtain the following results. The Pigouvian level of the environmental tax
rate is never an equilibrium of this game. Surprisingly, the equilibrium environ-
mental tax is larger when there is a minority of green voters than when they form a
majority. As a result, we ￿nd that a green party, de￿ned as a party that proposes
green voters￿most-preferred environmental policy, can only be part of an equilib-
rium political state (i.e., be stable) if there is a minority of green voters. This result
suggests that the main reason for the emergence of green parties is not simply to
be found in an increase in the number of voters holding green views. Rather, we
obtain that, for a green party to be stable, it is necessary for income polarization
to be large enough, compared to the saliency of the environmental issue, for the
non-green citizens. Finally, we show that a larger income polarization increases the
minimum income tax rate proposed by the green party.
Before proceeding, the connections between the present paper and our earlier
work (Anesi and De Donder, 2009) are noteworthy. In the latter, we studied the
role of party formation in a similar model where the second dimension is attitude
towards racism instead of an environmental issue. We di⁄er from that paper in two
main respects. First, the focus of Anesi and De Donder (2009) was to understand
why racist policies may emerge when a minority of people hold racist views. We
then made strong assumptions on the distribution of types but none on the relative
saliency of the two issues. By contrast, in the current paper we make no assumption
on the distribution of types (green voters may or may not form a majority) but
rather assume that the environmental dimension is secondary to the redistributive
one. Second, we adopt a di⁄erent collective choice model and, more speci￿cally, a
di⁄erent stability concept for political parties. In contrast to Anesi and De Donder
(2009) who allowed for deviations to smaller parties only and who considered purely
policy-motivated politicians, we allow here for mergers between existing parties and
we assume that politicians are both policy- and o¢ ce-motivated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic
environment and the political equilibrium concept. Section 3 explains in what sense
environmental taxation represents a secondary issue. Sections 4 and 5 analyze,
respectively, equilibrium taxes and the parties formed at equilibrium. Final remarks
are made in Section 6.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
There is a large citizenry with total mass equal to one, in an economy with two
goods: the numeraire and a polluting good, which are both produced at constant
3marginal cost, normalized to unity.4 Citizens are di⁄erentiated by their exogenous
income, ! 2 f!‘;!hg, with !‘ < !h, and their concern about pollution, j 2 fg;ng:
the ￿green voters￿(j = g) care for the pollution associated with aggregate consump-
tion of the polluting good, while the others (j = n) do not. Following Fredriksson
(1997), we assume that the preferences of green voters over the two consumption
goods are given by
c + V (x) ￿ ￿￿ x; (1)
where c and x are individual consumptions of the numeraire and the polluting good,
respectively, ￿ x is the aggregate consumption of the polluting good, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is a
parameter that measures the intensity of the green voters￿concerns about pollution.
This intensity is assumed to be the same for all green voters. The utility of a
non-green voter is simply given by
c + V (x): (2)
All individuals have the same taste for individual consumption of the polluting good,
which is represented by the continuous function V with the following properties:
V (0) ￿ 0, V 0 > 0, V 00 < 0, limx!0 V 0(x) = 1, and limx!1 V 0(x) < 1.
Let ￿ ￿ f!‘;!hg ￿ fg;ng be the type space, with generic element ￿
j
i = (!i;j).
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i = ‘;h and j = g;n. The proportion of voters with income level !i;i = ‘;h is
denoted by ￿i = ￿
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i + ￿n
i , whereas the proportion of green (respectively, non-green)




h (respectively, ￿n = ￿n
‘ + ￿n
h). Let ￿ ! ￿ ￿‘!‘ + ￿h!h
be the aggregate income, and assume as usual that the median income is below the
average (￿‘ > 1=2).
The policy that voters must choose is composed of a proportional income tax,
t 2 [0;1], and an environmental tax on the consumption of the polluting good,
e 2 [0;1]. Tax revenues are used to ￿nance a lump sum transfer to all citizens,
which is then determined as a residual: T = t￿ ! + e￿ x. Once a public policy (t;e)
has been decided, citizens choose the consumption level that maximizes their direct
utility ((1) for green and (2) for non-green citizens) subject to the individual budget
constraint
c + (1 + e)x ￿ (1 ￿ t)! + T:
Solving the consumers￿problem leads to the following characterization of the demand
for the polluting good, x(e):
V
0 (x) ￿ 1 + e:
Each individual￿ s choice is too small to a⁄ect the average quantity of the public
good, ￿ x, so that with quasi-linear preferences they all end up consuming the same
4This assumption is made to simplify the exposition. All results carry through to the case of
varying marginal costs.
4amount of the good,5 and ￿ x(e) = x(e). After appropriate rearrangements, the policy




! + t(￿ ! ￿ !) + V (x(e)) ￿ (1 + ￿)x(e) if j = g
! + t(￿ ! ￿ !) + V (x(e)) ￿ x(e) ifj = n: (3)
It is easy to obtain individual ￿
j
i￿ s most-preferred policy. Obviously, in the absence
of incentive e⁄ects from income taxation, poor voters favor income con￿scation
(t = 1), whereas rich voters prefer laissez-faire (t = 0). As for the environmental
policy, non green voters dislike any form of environmental taxation (e = 0), while
green voters￿ s most-preferred tax rate is equal to the intensity of their dislike of
pollution (e = ￿). Observe that, in our setting, the most-preferred environmental
tax of an individual is independent of her income. This is due to the fact that all
individuals consume the same quantity of the polluting good, so that environmental
taxation is not redistributive.6
Since nobody would prefer to increase e above ￿, without loss of generality we
restrict the policy space to be P = [0;1] ￿ [0;￿], with generic element (t;e). In
this economy, the collective choice of a public policy (t;e) is made through electoral
competition between endogenous political parties. We now turn to the description
of the electoral competition side of the model.
2.2 Political Parties and Elections
We propose the following adaptation of Levy (2004). We present that approach
in the context of our paper, but refer the reader to those papers for an in-depth
discussion of the basic assumptions.
Each group of voters is represented by a single politician who is a perfect rep-
resentative of her group, in that her policy preferences are given by (3). Politicians
running alone are unable to commit to any proposal di⁄ering from their ideal policy.
The key assumption of Levy (2004) is, however, that politicians can credibly com-
mit to a larger set of policies by forming political parties (or coalitions, to use the
language of game theory): the set of policies which a party can commit to is the
Pareto set of its members. Formally, a politician is an element ￿ of ￿ while a party
is a non-empty subset S of ￿. A policy (t;e) 2 P is in the Pareto set of party S,
5We assume that even poor individuals have income (or unmodelled wealth) large enough to
consume that amount.
6Modelling a situation where richer people consume more of the polluting good would be more
in line with reality (see De Donder et al. (2007), section 4, for the case of energy consumption),
but would complexify the analysis by adding a redistributive component to environmental taxa-
tion. Moreover, this added complexity would not generate additional insight about the political
phenomena under study.
5denoted by PS, if there is no other policy (t0;e0) such that u(t0;e0;￿) ￿ u(t;e;￿) for
all ￿ 2 S and u(t0;e0;^ ￿) > u(t;e;^ ￿) for some ^ ￿ 2 S.
The political game we study has two steps. The ￿rst step is one of party form-
ation, while the second step encompasses electoral competition, where all parties
simultaneously choose a feasible policy and compete in a winner-takes-all election.
We now describe how each step takes place, beginning with the electoral competition
game.
Electoral Competition
A party structure is a partition of ￿ into parties (i.e., we assume that all citizens
belong to a political party). Let ￿ be the set of party structures. We assume that
the result of the party formation stage is some arbitrary party structure ￿ 2 ￿.
Elections then proceed as follows. Every party S 2 ￿ chooses an electoral strategy
(or platform), namely a policy (tS;eS) 2 PS [ f?g, where ? means that the party
proposes no policy (we say that it does not run). In the case where no party runs for
election, every politician receives a zero payo⁄. If at least one party runs, we assume
that voters record their preferences sincerely over any list of candidate platforms,
p ￿ ((tS;eS))S2￿, and that the election is by plurality rule with no abstention.7 The
election outcome is then a fair lottery between the policies in
W(p) ￿
￿





where VS0 (p) denotes party S0￿ s realized vote share. We assume that parties prefer
not running to proposing a policy that will lose for sure.
Let  ￿(S) be the indicator function on 2￿ taking on the value of 1 if ￿ 2 S and 0
otherwise. Members of the winning party equally share an (arbitrarily small) non-
policy bene￿t ￿ > 0 (ego-rents, perks of o¢ ce...). As a consequence, the expected











if there is at least one party S 2 ￿ such that (tS;eS) 6= ?, and U(p;￿) = 0 otherwise.
Given a party structure ￿ 2 ￿, a vector of electoral strategies p = ((tS;eS))S2￿
is a ￿￿equilibrium of the electoral-competition game if, for all S 2 ￿, there is no
(t0
S;e0
S) 2 PS [ f?g , (t0
S;e0





S);p￿S;￿) ￿ U ((tS;eS);p￿S;￿)
7Voters who are indi⁄erent between several policies use a fair mixing device.
6for all ￿ 2 S, with at least one strict inequality. Let ￿(￿) be the set of ￿-equilibrium
policy outcomes.8
Stability of Party Structures
Up to this point, we have taken the party structure ￿ as given. We now turn to the
party formation stage and ask whether ￿ is a stable party structure. First of all,
note that there may exist multiple ￿-equilibria, and therefore multiple equilibrium
outcomes (￿(￿) may not be a singleton). Thus, ￿ may satisfy stability conditions
for one electoral outcome but not for others. As a consequence, we will not study
the stability of ￿ alone, but the stability of pairs (￿;p) where p is a ￿-equilibrium.
We will refer to them as political states. Which of these should be considered as
the set of equilibrium outcomes for the present model? The answer to this question
depends on the stability requirements imposed on party structures. The stability
condition we adopt in this paper is bi-core stability (Levy, 2004).9
Let ￿ and ￿0 be two party structures. ￿0 is said to be induced from ￿ if ￿0 is
formed by either breaking one party in ￿ into two, or by merging two existing parties
in ￿ into one. Forming a new party made up of subsets of current parties is excluded
on the basis that nobody would trust a politician who is willing to betray her current
partners. Mergers involving more than two existing parties are also excluded but,
in the context of the present paper, this restriction does not a⁄ect the results and
is only maintained for expositional simplicity.
We say that a political state (￿;p) is blocked by another political state (￿0;p0) if
there exists S ￿ ￿ such that: (1) S can induce ￿0 from ￿, and (2) for every ￿ 2 S,
U (p0;￿) > U (p;￿). We are now ready to de￿ne equilibrium political states:
De￿nition 1 Let ￿￿ 2 ￿ be a party structure and p￿ a pro￿le of electoral strategies
for ￿￿. The pair (￿￿;p￿) is an equilibrium political state (EPS) if (i) p￿ is a ￿￿-
equilibrium, and (ii) there is no political state (￿;p) that blocks (￿￿;p￿).
Thus, an equilibrium situation is de￿ned as one that meets two requirements:
￿rst, given the equilibrium party structure ￿￿, no party S 2 ￿￿ can make all its
8Any pro￿le of electoral strategies induces an electoral outcome which, due to the possibility of
a tie, may be a lottery between several policies. As a consequence, ￿(￿) is a subset of the family of
fair lotteries over P. Throughout the paper, we write hx1;:::;xni for the random mixture between
policies x1;:::;xn, but simply use x instead of hxi.
9As its de￿nition reveals, the bi-core stability concept does not allow for deviating coalitions
to be farsighted ￿i.e., to consider whether a blocking state is itself stable or not. There are two
justi￿cations to this assumption. First, ￿farsighted￿stability concepts ￿such as the equilibrium
processes of coalition formation (Konishi and Ray, 2003, Anesi, 2006b), or the extended equilibrium
binding agreements (Diamantoudi and Xue, 2007) ￿face serious tractability and existence problems
in voting situations with in￿nite sets of states, as in our paper. Second, a large body of experimental
literature rejects both individuals￿and groups￿farsightedness (the most recent contributions include
Hey and Knoll, 2007, and Bone et al., 2009).
7members better-o⁄ by deviating from its equilibrium announcement to a di⁄erent
platform in PS [ f?g; second, given the equilibrium platform pro￿le p￿, parties in
￿￿ are stable in the sense that no coalition of politicians can make all its members
strictly better-o⁄ by inducing another political state.
We are now in a position to apply this political equilibrium concept to our
economic environment.
3 Environmental Policy as a Secondary Issue
Before we turn to the formal characterization of political equilibria, we ￿rst de￿ne
what we mean by environmental policy being a ￿secondary issue￿ compared to
redistribution. Unlike List and Strum (2006), our de￿nition is not related to the
number of people caring for the environment, but rather to the intensity of their
preferences. To make this point more formally, some additional notation will prove
handy. Since the indirect utility functions (1) and (2) are separable in t and e,
we denote by ￿j the di⁄erence in utility level, for an individual of type ￿
j
i, j =
g;n, between her most-preferred and her least-preferred environmental policy in the
policy space P ￿ i.e.
￿
g ￿ u(t;￿;!;g) ￿ u(t;0;!;g) = V (x(￿)) ￿ V (x(0)) ￿ (1 + ￿)[x(￿) ￿ x(0)];
￿
n ￿ u(t;0;!;n) ￿ u(t;￿;!;n) = V (x(0)) ￿ V (x(￿)) ￿ [x(0) ￿ x(￿)]:
Similarly, we denote by ￿i the di⁄erence in utility level, for an individual of type ￿
j
i,
i = ‘;h, between her most-preferred and her least-preferred income taxation policy
in the policy space P ￿ i.e.
￿‘ ￿ u(1;e;!‘;j) ￿ u(0;e;!‘;j) = ￿ ! ￿ !‘ = ￿h (!h ￿ !‘);
￿h ￿ u(0;e;!h;j) ￿ u(1;￿;!h;j) = !h ￿ ￿ ! = ￿‘ (!h ￿ !‘):
For future reference, note that ￿‘ (and similarly ￿‘￿‘) can be seen as a measure
of income polarization, namely a measure of the saliency of the con￿ ict between the
rich and the poor. In the spirit of Esteban and Ray￿ s (1994) original de￿nition,
polarization should indeed rise as inequality (!h ￿!‘) increases and the sizes of the
two groups become closer to each other (￿h ! 1=2).
We impose the following restriction on preferences: for all individuals ￿
j
i, the
di⁄erence in utility level from moving from the least-preferred to the most-preferred
taxation policy is larger than the di⁄erence in utility from moving from the least-
preferred to the most-preferred environmental policy. Formally, we impose the fol-
lowing assumption:10
10Observe that ￿l < ￿h, because, by assumption, ￿l > 1=2:
8A1 maxf￿g;￿ng < ￿‘
Assumption A1 is the precise statement that environmental policy is a second-
ary issue compared to redistributive policy. This assumption imposes restrictions
on preferences over extreme policy bundles. It guarantees that every citizen prefers
a policy bundle comprising her ideal redistributive and worst environmental policies
to a bundle involving her worst redistributive and ideal environmental policies. For
instance, the non-green rich prefers no redistribution accompanied with a high pol-
lution tax to the total con￿scation of their income without pollution tax. By this
assumption, we do not deny that there may exist people who would be ready to give
up all their resources for higher pollution taxes, but we assume their mass is not
electorally signi￿cant.11
4 Environmental Taxes
We start with the benchmark case where there is no party formation.12
















f(1;￿)g if ￿g > 1=2;
f(1;0)g if ￿g < 1=2:
In the absence of party formation, our model boils down to the standard citizen-
candidate framework proposed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996),14 where the only
credible proposal by any citizen is her own most-preferred policy. In that case, the
set of feasible policies is restricted to {(1,0),(1,￿),(0,0),(0,￿)}, and assumption A1
guarantees the existence of a transitive majority voting ordering over this set. Since
poor outnumber rich citizens, any policy with income con￿scation gets a majority
compared to any policy with laissez-faire. If green voters outnumber non-green
(￿g > 1=2), for any tax policy, a policy with e = ￿ is favored by a majority to a
policy without environmental tax (e = 0). The policy (1;￿) is then a Condorcet
11List and Sturm (2006) report that the number of members in the three largest environmental
organizations (Greenpeace, the Sierra Club and the National Wildlife Federation) between 1987
and 2000 varies from a minimum of 0.25 percent of the population in Mississippi to a maximum
of just over 2 percent in Vermont.
12All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
13We assume away the case where ￿g = 1=2 ￿rst because this is a knife-edge situation, but, mainly
because considering this case increases considerably the length of the proofs without adding any




‘ > ￿h, and ; otherwise. The proof is available upon request.
14The model proposed by Besley and Coate (1997) di⁄ers in that it assumes that voters behave
strategically.
9winner among the four possible policies (i.e., it beats any other feasible option
through pairwise majority comparisons). In the case where ￿g < 1=2, the Condorcet
winning policy is (1;0).
It is easy to see that the Condorcet winning policy is an equilibrium of the
electoral competition game with partition ￿0. More precisely, the candidate most
preferring the Condorcet winner runs unopposed and obtains her most-preferred
policy since, by de￿nition, no other candidate can run with a di⁄erent policy and
defeat the Condorcet winner. The less easy part to prove in Lemma 1 is that there
is no other equilibrium. To do that, we consider in turn cases where more than one
candidate runs, (i.e., proposes his most-preferred policy), and we show that they can
not constitute equilibria. We now brie￿ y summarize how we proceed in the proof
in order to give the reader a better feeling as to how the electoral competition stage
gets solved in our model.
Since there is a strict transitive majority voting ordering over the four feasible
policies, it is impossible for two candidates to run at equilibrium and to tie. Given
our assumption that a losing candidate/party prefers no to run, we can rule out any
situation with two candidates running. The same intuition carries through to the
case where the four candidates run: given that poor outnumber rich voters, one rich
candidate loses for sure if they run, and thus prefers not to run. This leaves only
the possibility that three candidates run at equilibrium. Given that poor voters
form a majority, it is impossible to have a three-way tie with two rich candidates
running. With two poor and one rich candidates running, we show in the Appendix
that one poor candidate has an incentive not to run to guarantee that the other poor
candidate will win for sure. This is because, by assumption A1, a poor citizen prefers
the policy favored by the poor citizen-candidate of the other environmental type to
a random mixture between the three original policies. This proves that the only
equilibrium under ￿0 has one candidate running with the Condorcet winning policy.
We then obtain the very intuitive result that, in the absence of party formation, the
pollution tax is larger when there is a majority of green voters in the electorate.
We now turn to party formation. The main incentive to form a party is to
enlarge the set of policies that may credibly be proposed to the voters. Figure 1
depicts the Pareto set of all potential parties. Intuitively, parties made exclusively
of rich and poor green (resp., non-green) citizens may credibly propose any income
tax rate (t 2 [0;1]) provided that it is coupled with the maximum (resp. minimum)
preferred environmental tax rate e = ￿ (resp., e = 0). Similarly, a party made
exclusively of green and non-green poor (resp., rich) citizens may credibly propose
any environmental tax rate (e2 [0;￿]) provided they also propose full con￿scation,
t = 1 (resp., laissez-faire, t = 0).








hg), observe that the
environmental tax rates associated to interior income tax rates di⁄er according to
which opposite types compose the party. This is due to the fact that, with a majority
10of poor voters (￿‘ > 1=2), rich citizens care more about income tax policy than poor
citizens (in the sense that ￿h > ￿‘, as noted in footnote 10). A rich non-green
citizen will then compromise more on environmental policy (i.e., accepts (t;e) with
e > ￿=2 and 0 < t < 1 when forming a party with the poor green citizen) than a
poor non-green citizen, who will insist on a low value of e (e < ￿=2 for 0 < t < 1)
when joining forces with rich green citizens. Formally, when 0 < t < 1, we have
that (t;￿￿‘) 2 Pf￿
g
‘;￿n
hg; while (t;￿￿h) 2 Pf￿n
‘ ;￿
g
hg. Finally, the Pareto set of parties
composed of three types can easily be obtained from the previous case; and the
Pareto set of the four-type party is equal to the feasible set P.
We now proceed to a comparison between EPS when green voters are a majority
and when they are not. But before we state those results, the following remark is in
order. While EPS always exist in this model (see, for instance, the EPS described
immediately after footnote 15), unicity is far from being guaranteed. Therefore, to
make the equilibrium comparison meaningful, any statement about one or several
equilibrium policies must be true for all the equilibria associated to the case under
consideration. We start with the case where a majority of citizens are green.
Proposition 1 Suppose A1 holds. If ￿g > 1=2, then any environmental tax rate
e￿ that emerges in an EPS must satisfy e￿ ￿ ￿￿h.
The intuition for this result runs as follows. The poor green citizens are in a
position of power since there are more poor than rich voters, and more green than
non-green voters. As Lemma 1 shows, poor green citizens obtain their most favored
policy when no party forms. This hinders the formation of any party containing poor
green candidates. Take for instance a party composed of both green politicians. Poor
green voters have a double incentive to disband such a party: they would not have
to compromise on the income taxation issue and moreover they would not have to
share the spoils of o¢ ce (however small ￿ is) with their partner.
On the other hand, poor green citizens are not powerful enough to win against
all others because, by assumptions, ￿
g
l < 1=2. As a result, the citizen-candidate
equilibrium depicted in Lemma 1 is not an EPS, since the rich green citizens have
an incentive to form a party together with the poor non-green citizens in order to
propose a compromise policy (a positive but not extreme income tax coupled with a
low but positive environmental tax) that they both prefer to (1;￿) and that obtains





l ; proposing (t;￿￿h) for some 0 < t < 1; and running unopposed is an
EPS. In a nutshell, the poor green voters are ￿too powerful￿to form a stable party
but ￿not powerful enough￿to guarantee themselves against other parties. We then
obtain that poor green voters can not obtain their most-preferred environmental
15This statement is made formally in Lemma 2, which is presented and proved in the Appendix.
11policy (e = ￿), and moreover that there is no EPS where the environmental tax is
larger than ￿￿h.
This reasoning does not carry through to the case where green citizens form a
minority (￿g < 1=2). In that case, poor green voters have no incentive to break a
party made of rich as well as poor green voters, but on the contrary have an incentive
to join forces to increase environmental taxation. On the contrary, poor non-green
voters become powerful enough that they are reluctant to form a party. This explains
why the allocation described in the previous paragraph is not an EPS when ￿g < 1=2,
since the poor non-green voter would disband the party formed with the rich green
candidate in order to win outright with her most-preferred policy (1,0). The next
Proposition shows that all equilibrium political states exhibit a large environmental
component (e ￿ ￿￿‘) in that situation.
Proposition 2 Suppose A1 holds. If ￿g < 1=2, then any environmental tax rate ￿ e
that emerges in an EPS must satisfy ￿ e ￿ ￿￿‘.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we obtain the following surprising result: Due
to the party formation process, the environmental tax rate that emerges in a political
equilibrium is larger when there is a minority of green voters. This result illustrates
very starkly that, given our modelling of party formation and electoral competition,
an increase in the proportion of green voters need not result in more environmentally
friendly policies. Another immediate consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 is that
environmental quality is better when there is a minority of green voters.
Turning to the normative properties of EPS, observe ￿rst that, in our quasi-linear
setting without income tax distortions, a utilitarian planner is indi⁄erent between
all values of the income tax rate. The optimal utilitarian environmental tax rate is
given by its Pigouvian level, e￿ = ￿￿g: This Pigouvian level belongs to the Pareto
sets of the grand four-member party, of several three-member parties, and also of
two-member parties in the special case where ￿g 2 f￿h;￿‘g.
We then obtain the following corollary to Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 Every EPS is ine¢ cient, in the sense that the Pigouvian tax rate ￿￿g
is never implemented in equilibrium.
The ine¢ ciency of every EPS is driven by the link between the proportion
of green voters and the equilibrium environmental tax rate. The presence of a
majority of green citizens calls for a large Pigouvian tax (e > ￿=2) but generates an
equilibrium with a low tax rate (e < ￿=2), and vice versa when green citizens form
a minority.
To summarize, the main conclusion to draw from the discussion up to this point
is the following: When party formation is taken into consideration, the explanation
12for the emergence of green policies is not to be found in an increase in the proportion
of green voters. The next section will show that other factors, such as the saliency
of the environmental issue and the income polarization may play an important role
in explaining the emergence of green parties/policies.
5 Stable Green Parties
We now address the question of the existence of a green party, which is de￿ned
as a party o⁄ering the ideal environmental policy of green citizens. Formally, party
S ￿ ￿ is a stable green party if there exists an EPS (￿;p) such that S 2 ￿ and
eS = ￿. We already know from the previous section that a stable green party exists
only if there is a minority of green voters. The next proposition goes further.





following conditions hold: (a) ￿g < 1=2, (b) ￿‘￿‘ ￿ ￿n, and (c) ￿‘￿g ￿ ￿h￿n:




‘g is a stable green
party.
The only class of green party that may exist at equilibrium (i.e., be stable) is
composed of the two types of green voters. This is a consequence of the political
power of the poor non-green candidate, who belongs simultaneously to the majority
of poor voters (￿‘ > 1=2) and to the majority of non-green voters (￿g < 1=2). On
one hand, the poor non-green candidate does not wish to constitute a party with a
green candidate, since he is powerful enough alone. On the other, he has enough
electoral power to defeat a party composed of green and non-green citizens that
would run against him. The only stable green party must then be made of the two
green voters (who would not want to share power with and accommodate a third
type) running against the two separate non-green candidates.





‘g to be stable:
(a) The green citizens form a minority;
(b) Income polarization, measured by ￿‘￿‘, is large enough compared to the sali-
ency of the environmental issue for the non-green citizens, measured by ￿n;
(c) The saliency of the environmental policy for the green citizens is su¢ ciently
large compared to the saliency of this issue for the non-green citizens.
The intuition for condition (a) is familiar from the previous subsection: Proposi-
tion 1 establishes that equilibrium environmental taxes cannot exceed ￿￿h when the
13green citizens form a majority. But, even when the green citizens form a minority,
the green party has still to guard itself against two dangers, one external and one
internal to the party.
The external danger is the majority coalition formed by the non-green voters.
We show that such a threat can only be countered if condition (b) holds. Suppose,
to the contrary, that income polarization is relatively low. This weakens the re-
distributive con￿ ict between rich and poor non-green politicians, thereby causing
the defeat of the green party: a non-green candidate can run and win the elections
against the green party by getting the votes of all non-green voters (who outnum-
ber green voters), or the non-green politicians can compromise on the redistributive
issue and form a party that defeats the green party.
The internal danger faced by the green party consists in one of its two members
being wooed away by the policy of a non-green candidate. More precisely, if the poor
green and non-green voters were to both prefer the policy (1;0) to the compromise
policy (t;￿) proposed by the green party, then the policy (1;0) would be proposed
by the poor non-green candidate who would win the elections for sure since poor
voters form a majority. We show in the proof of Proposition 3 that this threat does
not materialize if condition (c) is satis￿ed.
By making it easier for the green politicians to compromise on the income
tax rate than for the non-green politicians, condition (c) has another e⁄ect on the
stability of the green party. It also ensures that, whenever it faces a party made of
the two non-green politicians, the green party can always ￿nd a policy that attracts
some non-green voters and then defeat its opponent. Combined with (b), condition
(c) therefore guarantees that non-green cannot coalesce in a party to defeat the
green party.
In the ￿rst part of Proposition 3, (a), (b), and (c) establish only necessary
conditions for the existence of a stable green party. However, the second part of
the Proposition reveals that reinforcing (c) (replacing it by (d)) su¢ ces to obtain
existence.
Proposition 3 has interesting implications in terms of the electoral alliances
between green and non-green voters and in term of the policies proposed by green
parties.
First, as we explained above, Proposition 3 shows that a large enough income
polarization is necessary for the emergence of a stable green party. Moreover, in-
creasing income polarization dampens the external threat to the existence of the
green party and also increases the minimum tax rate that the green party needs to
propose in order to fend o⁄ the internal threat ￿ i.e., to prevent the poor green
citizen from siding with the poor non-green citizen rather than supporting (t;￿).
This is illustrated in Figure 2, where the set of policies (t;￿) that are preferred by
14the poor green citizen to policy (1;0) shrinks (i.e., 1 ￿ ￿g=￿‘ increases) as income
polarization ￿represented here by ￿‘ ￿increases relative to the saliency of the envir-
onmental issue for green voters. The role of income polarization is then summarized
in the following
Remark 1 A large enough income polarization, namely ￿‘￿‘ ￿ ￿n, is necessary
to have a stable green party. Furthermore, when this condition holds, the minimum
equilibrium income tax rate proposed by the green party increases and converges to
one as income polarization becomes arbitrarily large.
Note that this result is in line with the fact that, according to the empirical evid-
ence, green parties are overwhelming associated with strong redistributive concerns
(see Neumayer, 2004, and the many references therein).
A second implication of Proposition 3 is that a party involving a non-green politi-
cian never o⁄ers a green policy (e = ￿) in equilibrium. Therefore, our model predicts
that ￿Red-Green alliances￿and (less common) ￿Blue-Green alliances￿between green
politicians and leftist/rightist non-green politicians typically fail to deliver the green
type￿ s most-preferred environmental policy.
A last implication is that a situation with two green parties is not stable. This
is also in line with real world experience, where situations with several green parties
coexisting (as in France in the 1990s) do not persist for long.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have built a model of electoral competition to assess the interplay
between political party formation and environmental taxation viewed as secondary
to the income taxation. We have de￿ned being a secondary issue in terms of the
intensity of preferences over this issue rather than in terms of numbers of voters
who care for it. We have built on Levy (2004) for the political equilibrium concept,
de￿ned as the solution to a two stage game where politicians ￿rst form parties
and where parties then compete by choosing a policy bundle in order to win the
elections.
The ￿rst two propositions together establish that the equilibrium environmental
tax is larger when the green voters represent a minority of the electorate than when
they form a majority. The main driving force behind this result is that, when
green voters form a majority, they are electorally too powerful to compromise and
form a party with other citizens, but not powerful enough to prevent other types
from merging into a party and defeating them. Observe that this result is very
di⁄erent from what we would obtain with, for instance, a median voter approach
applied sequentially to the two dimensions. In that case, a majority of poor and
15green voters would simply translate into a con￿scatory policy coupled with a large
environmental tax rate. Contrasting these results shows the importance of taking
into account the endogeneity of the political parties, both in terms of number of
parties and of their constituency. It also shows very starkly that, at least within the
con￿nes of our model, the reason for the emergence of green parties and policies is not
to be found in an increase in the proportion of voters who care for the environment.
Rather, as Proposition 3 illustrates, the saliency of the environmental issue and
income polarization play an important role in explaining why green parties and
green policies emerge at equilibrium.
More precisely, our model suggests the existence of a positive relationship
between income polarization and the existence of, and the degree of income re-
distribution proposed by, green parties. Although there exists a literature showing
that higher income inequality is associated with worse environmental results (see,
for instance, Boyce (1994), Heerink et al. (2001)), we are aware of no study linking
income inequality and green parties￿policies. We hope this paper contributes to
drawing the attention of applied researchers to this issue.
The remaining results of the paper regarding the existence, the number and the
policies of green parties, follow probably more closely our intuition. We obtain that
there can only be one stable party, which is made of both types of green voters,
who bargain over redistribution, but agree on environmental policy. This means
that a situation with two green parties di⁄ering in redistributive policy, such as
that experienced by France in the 1990s for instance, is not stable. We also obtain
that green parties are associated with large redistribution, in the sense that there
exists a lowerbound on the income tax rate proposed at equilibrium by any green
party. This is in line with the numerous empirical evidence, surveyed by Neumayer
(2004), which shows that green parties are located to the left on the redistributive
dimension.
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16Proof of Lemma 1
Let ￿m stand for the majority preference relation, and let ￿m and ￿m be its asym-
metric and symmetric parts, respectively. Under Assumption A1, this relation is a
transitive linear order over the set of politicians￿ideal policies whenever ￿g 6= 1=2:
If ￿g > 1=2: (1;￿) ￿m (1;0) ￿m (0;￿) ￿m (0;0),
If ￿g < 1=2: (1;0) ￿m (1;￿) ￿m (0;0) ￿m (0;￿).
With these useful observations in mind, we can now turn to the determination
of ￿0-equilibria.
￿ One-candidate equilibria
Consider ￿rst ￿0-equilibria in which a single party runs. An immediate con-
sequence of the above observations is that (?;(1;￿);?;?) (resp., (?;?;(1;0);?))
is the unique ￿0-equilibrium in which a single party runs whenever ￿g > 1=2 (resp.
￿g < 1=2). As a consequence, (1;￿) 2 ￿(￿0) when ￿g > 1=2, and (1;0) 2 ￿(￿0) when
￿g < 1=2.
￿ Two-candidate equilibria
Suppose that ￿g > 1=2. As ￿m is a transitive linear order, there is no ￿0-
equilibrium in which two candidates run against each other. Indeed, one of them
would lose for sure in such a situation and, by assumption, would choose not to run.
The same argument applies when ￿g < 1=2.
￿ Three-candidate equilibria





















situation cannot be a ￿0-equilibrium. Indeed, party f￿
n
‘g could deviate to ?, thereby
enforcing policy (1;￿) she strictly prefers to the fair lottery between the policies







hg running against each other cannot be a ￿0-equilibrium.
￿ Four-candidate equilibria
Our assumption on the distribution of types, namely ￿‘ > 1=2, rules out the case
where four candidates tie when running.




‘-politician) running alone and o⁄ering her
ideal policy (1;￿) (resp. (1;0)) is the unique ￿0-equilibrium when ￿g > 1=2 (resp.
￿g < 1=2). This proves the lemma.
17Proof of Proposition 1
We start with a series of useful lemmas.












Proof: Note ￿rst that (1;￿) = 2 Pf￿
g
h;￿n
‘g. From this (and the strict concavity of














Since (t;￿h￿) 2 Pf￿
g
h;￿n













‘-politicians strictly prefer (t1;￿h￿) to (0;0) and ￿‘ > 1=2, f￿
n
hg cannot
pro￿tably deviate by o⁄ering (0;0). Similarly, f￿
g
‘g cannot pro￿tably deviate by






h all strictly prefer (t1;￿h￿) to
(1;￿). This proves that (t1;￿h￿) 2 ￿ (￿4).
￿
Lemma 3 Suppose A1 holds. If ￿g > 1=2, then (1;￿) 2 ￿ (￿5) and there is no
EPS involving ￿5.
Proof: Given that we assume that parties which are indi⁄erent between running
and not running do not run, the ￿rst part of the above statement means that there
is a ￿5-equilibrium which involves party f￿
g
‘g running alone. Indeed, the Pareto sets
of the other parties in ￿5 do not contain (1;￿).
To prove the lemma, note that for any e 2 [0;￿] the policy (1;￿) defeats both







runs alone, and then o⁄ers (0;e) [resp. (1;0)], f￿
g
‘g can pro￿tably deviate by o⁄ering
her ideal policy (1;￿). Moreover, platform pro￿les of the form ((0;e);(1;￿);?) or
(?;(1;￿);(1;0)) cannot be ￿5-equilibria since f￿
g
‘g wins for sure. For the same
reason, f￿
g




‘g running alone in ￿5 cannot be an EPS. To see this note









hg should coalesce with f￿
n
‘g to induce ￿12. Doing so, they could
indeed implement (t1;￿￿h) which makes all of them strictly better-o⁄and share the
non-policy bene￿t ￿.
Consider now a pro￿le of the form ((0;e);?;(1;0)). An immediate implication
of Assumption A1 is that voters of type ￿
g
‘ strictly prefer (1;0) to (0;e) for any
e 2 [0;1]. As ￿‘ > 1=2, this implies that f￿
n
‘g wins for sure. This is then not an
equilibrium situation.
To complete the proof of Lemma 3, it then remains to show that the three parties
in ￿5 running at the same time is not an EPS. To see this, consider a platform pro￿le
((0;e);(1;￿);(1;0)) with e 2 [0;1]. As V (x(￿)) ￿ x(￿) ￿ V (x(e)) ￿ x(e), we have
1
3
[V (x(0)) ￿ x(0) + V (x(￿)) ￿ x(￿)] ￿
2
3












￿h(!h ￿ !‘) =
1
3
(￿ ! ￿ !‘) (4)
where the last inequality results from Assumption A1. Rearranging (4), we obtain
1
3
[2(￿ ! ￿ !‘) + V (x(e)) ￿ x(e) + V (x(0)) ￿ x(0) + V (x(￿)) ￿ x(￿)]



















This means that the ￿
n




the fair lottery between (0;e), (1;￿), and (1;0). Using a parallel argument we can
deduce from ￿g(￿) < ￿h (!h ￿ !‘) that the same is true for politician ￿
g
‘.




‘g can pro￿tably merge with each other to




‘g o⁄ering (1;e) and winning with
probability 1 is a ￿8-equilibrium. This proves that there is no ESP involving ￿5 and
ends the proof of Lemma 3.
￿








‘g to any policy in Pf￿
g
h;￿n




‘g beats any policy in Pf￿
g
h;￿n
hg in a pairwise vote. Thus, a strategy pro￿le is a






We now return to the main proposition. The idea is to check that, for every
j = 0;:::;14, the following statement is true:





, then e ￿ ￿h￿.
(Pk) is evidently true for k 2 f1;2;3g since we know from Lemma 1 that
politician ￿
g
‘ can always pro￿tably induce ￿0. Let us now turn to the other party
structures.
￿ k = 0





induce ￿4 from ￿0. This proves (P0).
￿ k = 4
To show (P4), we have to check that f￿
g
‘g can never win or tie for winning by




‘g can never win or tie for winning by o⁄ering a policy
of the form (0;e), with e 2 (￿h￿;1]. Note ￿rst that a tie between the three parties
in ￿4 is not consistent with our assumptions on the distribution of voters￿types
(￿‘ > 1=2 and ￿g > 1=2). A three-candidate equilibrium is therefore impossible.




We know that (t;￿h￿) 2 Pf￿
g
h;￿n
‘g defeats (1;￿) in a pairwise vote (recall the
proof of Lemma 2). This guarantees that f￿
g
‘g can never win with her ideal policy.









prefer (1;￿) to any policy of the form (0;e). This implies that (1;￿) is preferred by





‘g can never win by o⁄ering such a policy.
Finally, f(1;e);(1;￿);;g with e 2 (￿h￿;1] can not be an equilibrium, since a tie
between (1;e) and (1;￿) would require that ￿
g
h prefer the ￿rst to the latter, which
is impossible.
￿ k = 5
(P5) is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.
￿ k = 6




‘g can win with a
positive probability in an EPS involving ￿6. We distinguish between several cases:
20(i) f￿
g
‘g running alone and implementing (1;￿) cannot be an equilibrium situ-














pro￿tably induce ￿12 to enforce that policy and grasp the non-policy bene￿t.
(ii) A strategy pro￿le of the form (?;(1;￿);(t;0)) is also impossible in an EPS.







‘g. As ￿‘ > 1=2, this would imply that the voters of type ￿
n
‘
prefer (t;0) to (1;￿), and then that t > 0. It would also imply that the ￿
g
h-voters
would be indi⁄erent between (1;￿) and (t;0). But these last statements are in





could make all its members better-o⁄by deviating to a platform (t￿";0), with " > 0
very small. Although the ￿
n
‘ politician would incur a small utility loss, she would
be compensated by an increase in the non-policy bene￿t (￿=2 instead of ￿=4) as,
by continuity, the change in platform would attract ￿
g
h-voters and ensure her party￿ s
victory.
(iii) As (0;￿) is defeated by (1;￿) in a pairwise vote, f￿
g
hg running alone or
running against f￿
g
‘g cannot be equilibrium situations.
(iv) Suppose now the strategy pro￿le is ((0;￿);?;(t;0)). For this pro￿le to be
a ￿6-equilibrium, voters of type ￿
g
‘ must be indi⁄erent between (0;￿) and (t;0). As





deviate by o⁄ering (t + ￿;0). This would allow it to win and then to get ￿ for sure,
thus compensating its member of type ￿
n
h for the small utility loss caused by the
change in platform.













V (x(e2)) ￿ x(e2) ￿
2
3
[V (x(￿)) ￿ x(￿)] +
1
3
[V (x(0)) ￿ x(0)]:
It is easy to see that (t2;e2) is a certainty equivalent of h(0;￿);(1;￿);(t;0)i for both
non-green politicians. Now, de￿ne e3 as follows
V (x(e3)) ￿ (1 + ￿)x(e3) ￿
2
3




[V (x(0)) ￿ (1 + ￿)x(0)]:
By de￿nition, (t2;e3) is a certainty equivalent of h(0;￿);(1;￿);(t;0)i for the ￿
g
‘-
politician. Our curvature conditions further imply that e3 < ￿=3 < ￿￿‘ (the tie
between the three candidates implies that ￿
g
‘ = 1=3, and then ￿‘ > 1=3), and




hg, and that both non-green politicians
strictly prefer (t2;e3) to h(0;￿);(1;￿);(t;0)i. For the ￿
n
‘-politician to accept the











hg strictly better-o⁄ (non-policy
bene￿ts remain unchanged for the green politician and increase for the non-green
politicians).
￿ k = 7









‘), thus implying that (1 ￿ ";￿) 2 ￿ (￿1).
Indeed, our assumptions on the distribution of types (￿‘ > 1=2 and ￿g > 1=2)




‘g cannot be defeated in ￿1 when it o⁄ers (1 ￿ ";￿).




‘g must win for





such that t < 1. Then, ￿
n
‘ can pro￿tably induce ￿1 and then (1;￿), which is her








‘g implements (1;￿). Then, ￿
n
h can
pro￿tably induce ￿1 and then (1￿";￿) 2 ￿(￿1). As a consequence, there is no EPS
involving ￿7 and (P7) evidently holds.
￿ k = 8




‘g wins with a probability of 1 in ￿8-equilibrium. But
politician ￿
g
‘ can induce ￿5, thereby enforcing her ideal policy and getting a bene￿t
of ￿ instead of ￿=2. Thus, there is no EPS involving ￿8.
￿ k = 9
If condition (P9) does not hold, then one of the following situations must arise.









‘g can ensure its victory by o⁄ering (0;e+￿), with ￿ arbitrarily
small. Both green politicians prefer this policy to (0;e). Moreover, as ￿ is very small,
the ￿
n
‘-politician is compensated by an increase in her bene￿t of at least ￿=4:
u(0;e;￿
n










hg o⁄ers a policy (t;e) of the form (t;￿‘￿) with
t > 0 or (1;e) with e > ￿‘￿.




‘g has again a pro￿table





through (t;e). These curves cross each other at another point, say (t0;e0). It is easy








‘g to win for sure.




‘g o⁄ers a policy (0;e) with e > ￿￿h.




hg has a pro￿table
deviation. If e > ￿￿‘, then there exists a policy in Pf￿
g
‘;￿n
hg which is strictly preferred






‘. A deviation to this policy is therefore








‘g cannot o⁄er a pollution tax that
exceeds ￿￿h in a ￿9-equilibrium.
￿ k = 10


































‘g n (P1 [ P2):
Under structure ￿10, the three-member party must win for sure in an equilibrium,





‘g ￿ P1 [ P2 [ P3. We distinguish between three
di⁄erent cases.




‘g can induce ￿2, thus enforcing (1;￿)
and obtaining a bene￿t of ￿=2 instead of ￿=3.






(iii) It o⁄ers a policy (t;e) in P3nPf￿
g
h;￿n
‘g. Substituting (t;e) to (1;￿) in the proof


















‘g can pro￿tably induce ￿4. Doing so, they indeed enforce a
better policy and no longer share the non-policy bene￿t with ￿
g
‘.
Suppose that (t;e) 2 P3\Pf￿
g
h;￿n
‘g. This implies that (t;e) satis￿es the conditions





can enforce the same policy without sharing the non-policy bene￿t with ￿
g
‘.
This proves that there is no EPS involving party structure ￿10.
￿ k = 11
From Lemma 3, we know that ￿
g
‘￿ s ideal policy (1;￿) 2 ￿ (￿5). As ￿ > 0, the
￿
g
‘-politician has consequently a pro￿table deviation to ￿5.
￿ k = 12
For (P12) to be true, it su¢ ces to check that the big party in ￿12 never o⁄ers a
policy (0;e) with e > ￿h￿, and that f￿
g







hg o⁄ers a policy of the form (0;e) with e > ￿￿h, it is defeated
with a probability of 1 by f￿
g
‘g which o⁄ers (1;￿). Indeed, under A1, voters of type
￿
n







hg runs in a ￿12-equilibrium, then it o⁄ers an environmental tax at most
equal to ￿￿h.
Let us now turn to party f￿
g
‘g. This party can only o⁄er (1;￿) which is defeated





hg in pairwise vote (see Lemma 2). As a result, it can never
win in a ￿12-equilibrium.
￿ k = 13
Suppose that, contrary to (P13), a policy (t;e) with e > ￿￿h emerges in a ￿13-
equilibrium. This cannot be an EPS. To see this, suppose ￿rst that t < 1. Then (t;e)












‘ strictly better-o⁄ and is a ￿2-equilibrium policy.
Indeed, it is easy to see that, under conditions A1 and ￿‘ > 1=2, (t;e) 2 ￿ (￿2) for




Suppose now that the policy (t;e) under consideration satis￿es t = 1 and
e ￿ ￿￿‘. It is easy to see that any such a policy is a ￿3-equilibrium policy (im-








hg can pro￿tably induce ￿3,
thus enforcing the same policy (t;e) without sharing the non-policy bene￿t with ￿
n
‘.
If e < ￿￿‘, then (t;e) = 2 Pf￿
g
‘;￿n








h strictly better o⁄. Substituting (t0;e0) to (t;e) in
the previous reasoning proves (P13).
￿ k = 14





‘g. This implies that there exists (t00;e00) 2 Pf￿
g
‘;￿n

















‘g should then induce ￿8 so as
to enforce (t00;e00) and raise the bene￿t of its members.
To show that (P14) is true, we must therefore show that the grand party im-
plementing a policy (1;e) 2 Pf￿
g
‘;￿n
‘g, with e > ￿￿h, is not an EPS. For every
e > ￿￿h > 0, there exists by continuity an " > 0 such that e ￿ " ￿ 0 and
u(1;e;￿
g






Moreover, Lemma 4 establishes that (1;e ￿ ") 2 ￿ (￿8). This proves that a devi-




‘g, thus completing the proof of
Proposition 1.





i, i 2 f‘;hg, and ￿n to ￿g in the proof of Proposition 1, we can
24prove Proposition 2 in like manner.
Proof of Proposition 3
Our proof of Proposition 3 will proceed in three short steps. Given our previous
￿ndings, we already know that there cannot be a stable green party when there is a
majority of green voters. We consequently assume throughout that ￿g < 1=2.





We can directly infer from Lemma 1 that there is no stable green party in ￿0,




hg o⁄ers (1;￿) than f￿
n
‘g can win for sure by o⁄ering its
ideal policy: ￿
n
h-voters strictly prefer (1;0) to (1;￿) and ￿n > 1=2.
Policy (0;￿) is defeated by both (1;0) and (1;￿) in pairwise vote. Therefore,




hg runs alone, or against a single opponent,
and o⁄ers (0;￿). Under assumption A1, the ￿
n
h-politician strictly prefers (1;0) to
h(0;￿);(1;￿);(1;0)i. A parallel argument to that used to prove Lemma 3 would
show that there is no three-candidate ￿5-equilibrium.
The non-green party wins with a probability of 1 in any ￿6- and ￿7-equilibrium
since ￿n > 1=2.
The no EPS involving ￿8. Indeed, ￿
n
‘ can pro￿tably induce the ￿5-equilibrium


















‘g] that allows the latter to win for sure.
Consider ￿10 and ￿13 now. Under these party structures, the three-member
party must win for sure. Suppose it o⁄ers a policy of the form (t;￿). As ￿ > 0,















must prefer (t;￿) to (1;0) (otherwise, f￿
n
‘g could win by o⁄ering (1;0)). But then,





h prefer (t0;￿￿‘) to (t;￿). Indeed, a brief inspection of the structure of
preferences reveals that the analysis of EPS involving ￿3 when ￿g < 1=2 is symmetric
to the analysis of EPS involving ￿4 when ￿g > 1=2. We can then deduce from Lemma





deviate by inducing ￿3 and enforcing (t0;￿￿‘).
In a ￿12-equilibrium, the bigger party never o⁄ers (0;￿). Since ￿
n
‘ voters strictly
prefer (1;￿) to (0;￿), f￿
g
‘g could indeed win for sure by o⁄ering (1;￿).
Finally, the grand coalition is not a stable green party. Suppose the unique
party in ￿14 o⁄ers a policy of the form (t;￿). As ￿ > 0, inducing ￿8 and enforcing





25Step 2: A stable green party exists only if ￿h￿‘ (!h ￿ !‘) ￿ ￿n and condition
(c) in the statement of Proposition 3 hold.
An immediate consequence of Step 1 is that the only party structure in which
there can be a stable green party is ￿1. A little re￿ ection suggests that the analysis
EPS involving ￿1 when ￿g < 1=2 is symmetric to the analysis of EPS involving ￿6
when ￿g > 1=2. Inspecting the case k = 6 in the proof of Proposition 1 thus reveals
that, when ￿g < 1=2, there is no EPS in which the green party runs against one or
two rival candidates.
Our focus is therefore on EPS of the form (￿1;h(t;￿);?;?i) where t 2 [0;1].
((t;￿);?;?) cannot be a ￿1-equilibrium if one of the following conditions hold:
(i) ￿
g
‘-voters strictly prefer (1;0) to (t;￿) (party f￿
n
‘g can o⁄er (1;0) and win
for sure since ￿‘ > 1=2) or, equivalently, t < 1 ￿ ￿g=￿‘;
(ii) ￿
n
‘-voters strictly prefer (0;0) to (t;￿) (party f￿
n
hg can o⁄er (0;0) and win
for sure since ￿n > 1=2) or, equivalently, t < ￿n=￿‘;
(iii) ￿
n
h-voters strictly prefer (1;0) to (t;￿) (party f￿
n
‘g can o⁄er (1;0) and win
for sure since ￿n > 1=2) or, equivalently t > 1 ￿ ￿n=￿h.

















Therefore, a necessary condition for ((t;￿);?;?) to be a ￿1-equilibrium is that T





‘g is a stable green party whenever ￿h￿‘ (!h ￿ !‘) > ￿n and
￿h￿g > ￿‘￿n.
When ￿‘￿g > ￿h￿n and ￿h￿‘ (!h ￿ !‘) > ￿n, there is a tax rate t that belongs
to the interior of T. Then, it follows from the above argument that ((t;￿);?;?) is
a ￿1-equilibrium. What remains to be proved, therefore, is that (￿1;((t;￿);?;?))
is an EPS.




‘g cannot be part of a deviating coalition: (t;￿)
belongs to the Pareto set of that coalition and forming a larger party with another
politician would make their non-policy bene￿t decrease. Moreover, we know from














hg must run alone in a ￿7-equilibrium. Suppose ￿rst that it o⁄ers a policy
(t0;0) 2 Pf￿n
‘ ;￿n




h). Then, tedious computations











h strictly prefer (t00;￿) to (t0;0) is nonempty whenever ￿‘￿g > ￿h￿n. This
implies that the green party can pro￿tably deviate by o⁄ering (t00;￿), and then
(t0;0) = 2 ￿ (￿7).











‘), then the green party can also pro￿tably deviate
whenever ￿h￿g > ￿‘￿n. As
ft












whenever ￿h￿‘ (!h ￿ !‘) > ￿n, this proves that there is no ￿7-equilibrium, and
then no possible deviation from ￿1, when ￿h￿‘ (!h ￿ !‘) > ￿n.
Combining Steps 1-3, we obtain the proposition.
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